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Arbitration at the Tipping Point: 
Challenging Claim-Suppressing Arbitration 
Clauses 
James Parrinello* 
If you have entered into a contract for goods or services with a corporation recently, then 
chances are that an arbitration clause governs any potential legal claims you may have 
arising from that contractual relationship. In theory, arbitration is a cheap and efficient 
way to assert claims and allows a claimant to avoid the backlogged court system. For 
consumers, however, arbitration has morphed into a dispute resolution system that is no 
longer a fair alternative to the courts. Two recent Supreme Court decisions have validated 
corporations’ use of the inequitable, claim-suppressing mechanism known as a class 
action arbitration waiver. The simple clause prevents claimants from forming groups to 
assert common claims and share costs in the arbitral proceeding. In practice, a 
corporation with an enforceable class action arbitration waiver will reap a windfall 
because an individual claimant will choose not to pursue a claim that will cost more to 
bring than she expects to recover. In court, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for 
class action lawsuits when individual claims would not be viable. Class action arbitration 
waivers eliminate the comparable mechanism in arbitration and provide corporations 
with a strong incentive to insert such clauses into contracts with consumers. This Note 
analyzes recent Supreme Court class arbitration precedent and considers potential 
challenges to these disadvantageous arbitration clauses. 
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2014; hopeful bar passer and
future lawyer. I would like to thank Professor Leo Martinez, not only for being instrumental in helping 
me to craft the topic and hone the substance of this Note, but also for his unconscionable 1L contracts 
exam that shocked me out of academic cruise control. Special shout out to my study group, the 
University of Rochester Men’s Soccer team, and my friends for putting up with me through law school. 
Finally, to my parents and siblings (yes you, sis and bro-in-law), many thanks for supporting me and 
helping me reach this point. It was not a fun process, but hopefully the end product more than makes 
up for an often trying three years.  
1442 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1441 
Table of Contents 
Introduction .............................................................................................. 1442 
I.  Background .......................................................................................... 1444 
A. The Rise of Arbitration and Class Action 
Arbitration Waivers ............................................................. 1444 
1. The Federal Arbitration Act ............................................. 1444
2. Policy Rationale for Arbitration ...................................... 1446
3. Class Action Arbitration Waivers .................................... 1448
II. The Supreme Court Solidifies the Enforceability of
CAAWs ................................................................................................ 1450 
A. AT&T MOBILITY LLC V. CONCEPCION .................................... 1451 
1. The Discover Bank Rule ................................................... 1451
2. Concepcion Overrules Discover Bank ............................ 1452
B. The “Vindication of Statutory Rights” Doctrine .......... 1453 
III. Confusion Among the Circuits After CONCEPCION ..................... 1455
A. The Majority of Lower Courts Follow CONCEPCION ....... 1456 
B. The Second Circuit Follows GREEN TREE ......................... 1457 
IV. ITALIAN COLORS Radically Alters the Arbitration
 Landscape ............................................................................................ 1458 
V.  Possible Challenges and a Proposed Way Forward .................. 1460 
A. State-Law Preemption and Federal Law Conflict ........ 1460 
1. State-Law Challenges ........................................................ 1460
2. Federal-Law Challenges ................................................... 1462
B. Federal Legislation ............................................................. 1463 
1. The Arbitration Fairness Act ............................................ 1464
2. FAA Amendment or Similar Federal Legislation .......... 1465
Conclusion ................................................................................................ 1466 
Introduction 
Millions of consumers enter into contractual agreements with 
corporations every day. Disputes relating to these transactions are bound 
to occur, and both contracting parties have an incentive to settle disputes 
in a fair, quick, inexpensive, and informal manner over the alternative of 
slow and costly litigation. Arbitration has emerged as the most 
prominent dispute resolution system, with the Dominant Contracting 
Party (“DCP”)1 often inserting arbitration clauses or provisions into 
1. This classification denotes a party dominantly situated during and after negotiating the
agreement as a whole. The Dominant Contracting Party (“DCP”) may have such superior position 
because: they are wealthier and have a team of advisors on staff; are better-versed in the applicable 
law; have repeatedly contracted with similar parties and know how to respond in certain situations; or 
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contracts with consumers to restrict court access and prevent the 
adjudication of claims.2 
An overwhelming majority of these arbitration clauses now contain 
class action arbitration waivers (“CAAWs”). CAAWs prohibit a 
representative from asserting the claims of a group of similarly affected 
individuals in an arbitral proceeding.3 This forces the vulnerable 
contracting party (“VCP”),4 often a consumer or small entity similarly 
lacking in bargaining leverage or the wherewithal for counsel to 
individually bear any and all costs not specifically assumed or shared by 
the DCP in the initial contract. The sentiment among leading arbitration 
commentators is that “[t]he ‘class waiver’ issue is the single most 
contentious issue surrounding arbitration provisions” in contracts of 
adhesion with consumers.5 
In 2011, the Supreme Court decided AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion,6 holding that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) 
preempted California’s Discover Bank7 rule that prohibited certain 
CAAWs as “unconscionable.”8 This past year, the Supreme Court 
determined in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant that the 
“vindication of statutory rights” doctrine, which permits invalidation of 
arbitration agreements based on public policy grounds, did not apply to 
situations in which proving the underlying violations would be so costly 
that it would effectively prevent an individual from asserting a claim.9 
they have the market power to offer the contract on a take it or leave it basis. Many of the sources 
cited in this Note often refer to this type of party generally as “corporations”—the term used here 
seeks to clarify scholarship and encompass all of the different types of parties with the dominant 
contracting position.  
2. See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through Preispute
Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 Law & Contemp. Probs. 55, 56 (2004) 
(explaining how arbitration provisions proliferated in consumer contracts). 
3. See Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the
Class Action Survive?, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 8–9 (2000); see also Edward Wood Dunham, The 
Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, 16 Franchise L.J. 141, 142 (1997) (urging franchisors to 
adopt binding arbitration.  
4. A Vulnerable Contracting Party (“VCP”) generally refers to the party offered a contract on a
take it or leave it basis, without the leverage to cause meaningful change to the terms of the 
agreement. This term includes incorporated entities that have little or no bargaining power when 
dealing with a more powerful party. 
5. Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, 
Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 323, 371 (2011). See 
generally Richard M. Alderman, Why We Really Need the Arbitration Fairness Act: It’s All About 
Separation of Powers, 12 J. Consumer & Com. L. 151 (2009) (explaining that class arbitration, though 
widely criticized, is an extremely valuable tool for consumer redress and marketplace control). 
6. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011). 
7. 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). 
8. The term “unconscionable” was originated by the Uniform Commercial Code section 2-302 
and has been adopted in the California Civil Code § 1670.5 as a contract defense. See Cal. Civil Code 
§ 1670.5 (West 2011). 
9. 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312–13 (2013). 
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Taken together, these decisions leave consumers subject to CAAWs with 
little hope for redress and permit DCPs to contractually suppress 
individual claims. 
This Note explains the consequences CAAWs have on consumer 
claims and how the Supreme Court’s FAA and “effective vindication” 
analyses have rendered CAAWs almost unchallengeable, and outlines the 
possible strategies a VCP may employ to evade cost-prohibitive individual 
arbitration due to the presence of a CAAW. Specifically, this Note argues 
that either an amendment to the FAA or enactment of similar federal 
legislation is needed to provide claimants with the means to invalidate 
arbitration provisions containing CAAWs that immunize DCPs from 
liability. 
I.  Background 
A. The Rise of Arbitration and Class Action Arbitration Waivers 
Arbitration, the process of submitting disputes to a neutral party to 
render binding decisions and awards, was primarily utilized by commercial 
entities and trade associations from this country’s inception to the early 
1920s.10 During this period, arbitration remained confined to the business 
world because the process of arbitrating disputes was considered 
“outside of and in tension with the legal system.”11 Common law courts 
refused to compel arbitration because they considered arbitration 
agreements to be revocable by either party at any time.12 Courts expressed 
concern that arbitration agreements “ousted” the court of its jurisdiction13 
and that there was no way to ensure the process would be fair and 
equitable.14 Therefore, parties had to litigate “disputes notwithstanding 
arbitration clauses,” rendering them completely ineffective.15 
1. The Federal Arbitration Act
Congress responded in 1925 by passing what is now known as the 
Federal Arbitration Act.16 Specifically, section 2 of the FAA provides, in 
pertinent part: “A written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a 
10. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 931, 971–72 (1999). 
11. Id. at 973. 
12. Id. at 975. 
13. See Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874) (“[A]greements in advance to oust the courts of 
the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void.”). 
14. Van Wezel Stone, supra note 10, at 975. 
15. Rhonda Wasserman, Legal Process in a Box, or What Class Action Waivers Teach Us About
Law-Making, 44 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 391, 395 (2013). 
16. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012). Initially the legislation was titled the United States Arbitration Act
of 1925, ch. 213, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307 (1994)) 
[hereinafter FAA]. 
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transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy 
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any such contract.”17 
Following the legislation’s passage, the Supreme Court interpreted 
the FAA to be a clear “congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or 
procedural policies to the contrary.”18 Accordingly, arbitration provisions 
were to be evaluated on the same footing as all other contractual 
provisions.19 
Many scholars question whether Congress intended the FAA to make 
arbitration provisions enforceable in all contracts, regardless of the identity 
of the contracting parties.20 Some argue that the legislative history 
indicates that Congress intended the FAA to only govern arbitration 
provisions in contracts between commercial entities.21 However, the 
Supreme Court determined that section 2 of the FAA extends to all 
arbitration provisions regardless of the type of contract, including those 
embedded in consumer contracts.22 In Perry v. Thomas,23 the Court 
identified the FAA as a valid exercise of congressional power under the 
Commerce Clause and extended its application to state courts in the 
context of transactions involving interstate commerce.24 Under the 
17. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
18. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
19. Id. 
20. See, e.g., Margaret L. Moses, Arbitration Law: Who’s in Charge?, 40 Seton Hall L. Rev. 147 
(2010); see also Letter from Gary M. Paul, President, Am. Assoc. for Justice, to Monica Jackson, 
Office of the Exec. Sec’y, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (June 23, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.org/cps/rde/xbcr/justice/CFPB_Arbitration_Comments_6-12_aaj.pdf.  
21. See, e.g., Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a
Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 99, 107 (2006) (referring to 
testimony of Julius Cohen, General Counsel for the New York State Chamber of Commerce, in 
Congressional hearings that the bill would not apply to contracts of adhesion); David S. Schwartz, 
Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 Ind. L.J. 239, 243 (2012) (concluding that 
“[a]rbitration under the FAA was not intended to be a claim-suppressing vehicle for the benefit of 
wealthier parties in one-sided contracts,” and it should never be extended to parties outside of the 
business or trade community); Wasserman, supra note 15, at 399 (“[T]he Act was not intended to 
validate arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion, but rather to render enforceable voluntary 
arbitration agreements between merchants.”). 
22. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 113 (2001) (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation that the FAA does not apply to consumer contracts). 
23. 482 U.S. 483 (1987). 
24. See Stipanowich, supra note 5, at 328 (citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987)); see 
also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1984). 
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Supremacy Clause, the FAA preempts state law25 and thus all arbitration 
agreements except those that remain purely intrastate are enforceable.26 
2. Policy Rationale for Arbitration
Congress unanimously passed the FAA in order to “reverse the 
longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements . . . and to place 
arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.”27 
Supporters contend that arbitration “‘takes less time and costs less than 
litigation;’ it is ‘fair and effective;’ and it offers ‘a quick, cheap, and easy 
dispute resolution mechanism’ that is ‘more efficient’ than resolving 
disputes through litigation.”28 Other benefits include the preservation of 
parties’ relationships,29 confidentiality from disclosure,30 and the increased 
predictability of outcomes due to arbitrator expertise and incentives.31 
Arbitration is not universally lauded. Opponents argue that, while 
arbitration is in theory an inexpensive and quick alternative to the court 
system, in reality the system is rigged against VCPs.32 The setup of 
arbitration inherently incentivizes arbitrators to lessen claimant damages 
to influence repeat players—almost always DCPs—to select those 
arbitrators for future dispute resolution.33 Arbitration also tends to be a 
“less elaborate means of adjudication than litigation,” so the contracting 
parties “should not expect the full panoply of procedural and substantive 
25. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2. See generally Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Fla. Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963). 
26. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277–79 (1995) (noting the distinction
between the typical “involving interstate commerce” test under the commerce clause and section 2’s 
“evidencing a transaction involving commerce,” but concluding that the FAA applies if there is 
commerce in fact). 
27. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991). For clarity’s sake, the Supreme
Court often uses the terms “agreement to arbitrate” interchangeably with “arbitration provision.” This 
Note uses the less confusing “arbitration provision” or “arbitration clause” whenever possible. 
28. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration
Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 871, 878 (2008) (citations 
omitted). 
29. See generally Nat’l Arbitration Forum, Business-to-Business Mediation/Arbitration vs.
Litigation: What Courts, Statistics & Public Perceptions Show About How Commercial 
Mediation and Commerical Arbitration Compare to the Litigation System (Jan. 2005). 
30. Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1211,
1222−26 (2006). 
31. Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and Arbitration: An
Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. Legal. Stud. 549, 575 (2003). 
32. See, e.g., Frederick L. Miller, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts: Building Barriers to
Consumer Protection, 78 Mich. B.J. 302, 303–04 (1999) (outlining the various ways in which arbitration 
makes consumer claims more difficult). 
33. See id.; see also Caroline E. Mayer, Win Some, Lose Rarely? Arbitration Forum’s Rulings
Called One-Sided, Wash. Post, Mar. 1, 2000, at E01. 
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protection offered by a court of law.”34 A sophisticated party might 
understand this point from the outset and use it to its advantage, while a 
party lacking experience in dispute resolution would likely not 
understand that this could make proving a claim difficult or even 
impossible. Further, arbitration limits claimants in a number of ways that 
litigation does not—it provides for minimal discovery, prevents the right 
to a jury trial, and seriously limits the right to appeal the decision or 
award.35 
DCPs particularly prefer arbitration to litigation when handling 
disputes with VCPs, such as customers, employees, and smaller business 
entities, for a number of reasons. First, arbitration lowers defense costs 
and plaintiffs’ fees because discovery and pretrial motions are generally 
reduced or even eliminated.36 Second, arbitration lowers damage awards, 
as arbitrators are more likely to “split the baby” by providing some 
recovery although giving less than what a jury would.37 Third, arbitration 
provisions generally require absolute privacy, keeping any findings or 
decisions away from the public eye and preventing media coverage of a 
dispute or award.38 This prevents other claimants from relying on the 
facts or conclusions uncovered in the proceeding. Finally, the Supreme 
Court’s FAA jurisprudence authorized a powerful contractual weapon 
that, when crafted carefully, can render VCPs unable to assert certain 
claims against DCPs. This weapon is the Class Action Arbitration 
Waiver.39 
34. Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use)
Arbitration Clauses?, 25 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 433, 453 (2010) (quoting Bowles Fin. Grp. Inc. v. 
Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., 22 F.3d 1010, 1011 (10th Cir. 1994)). 
35. Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine: How the 
California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 Hastings Bus. L.J. 39, 41−42 (2006). 
36. David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer
Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 33, 60. 
37. Id. To be fair, this works both ways, because the arbitrator will sometimes award unmeritorious
claims limited damages. See Douglas Shontz et al., Rand Institute for Civil Justice, Business-to-
Business Arbitration in the United States, at ix, 12 (2011), available at http://www.rand.org/ 
content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2011/RAND_TR781.pdf. Overall though, when dealing with 
larger potential awards, this benefits the DCP because they have the deeper pockets. 
38. Id. This exacerbates the problem presented by CAAWs because even if a claimant pursues
individual arbitration, information or facts adduced from the proceeding cannot be shared with other 
potential claimants. See, e.g., Unif. Arbitration Act § 17(e) (2000) (“An arbitrator may issue a 
protective order to prevent the disclosure of privileged information, confidential information, trade 
secrets, and other information protected from disclosure.”). 
39. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010) (explaining that an
arbitration provision that is silent on the issue of class-wide arbitration “cannot be compelled to 
submit their dispute to class arbitration”). This decision implicitly suggests that contractual language 
preventing a class from forming would be upheld. See Stipanowich, supra note 5, at 333 (noting that 
the Stolt decision was “perceived by some as a clear signal of the Court’s lack of receptiveness to 
concerns about the impact of arbitration provisions on plaintiff’s ability to bring class actions”). 
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3. Class Action Arbitration Waivers
The Supreme Court has long endorsed the mechanism by which a 
representative asserts claims in court on the behalf of a class of similarly 
situated individuals. Class action lawsuits “overcome the problem that 
small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a 
solo action . . . . A class action solves this problem by aggregating the 
relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s 
(usually an attorney’s) labor.”40 Congress recognized the need to permit 
plaintiffs to form collectively and codified that practical necessity in 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.41 Without the ability to 
form a class and share costs, individuals would be faced with an 
overwhelming disincentive to assert their personal claims, thus immunizing 
the defendant from liability.42 
When Congress enacted the FAA’s precursor in 1925, the concept of 
forming a class to assert a common claim (whether in litigation or 
arbitration) was unprecedented.43 Nonetheless, with the Supreme Court’s 
strict adherence to the notion that arbitration provisions must be enforced 
as written, DCPs began adding CAAWs to the arbitration provisions of 
consumer contracts while relying on the FAA to support their 
enforceability.44 Current iterations of CAAWs typically require that any 
dispute arising from the contractual relationship may be arbitrated at the 
election of either side rather than litigated in court.45 
40. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit
Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
41. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23; see also Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 
1191 (2013) (reaffirming that under Rule 23, “[a plaintiff must demonstrate] numerosity, commonality, 
typicality, and adequacy of representation . . . and [a plaintiff] must also establish that ‘the questions of 
law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 
adjudicating the controversy’”). 
42. See Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The realistic 
alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic 
or a fanatic sues for $30.”). 
43. See Wasserman, supra note 15, at 399 (“The FAA is silent on the issue of class-wide
arbitration . . . .[because] [w]hen Congress passed the [FAA] in 1925, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure had not yet been promulgated and class action litigation for damages was virtually 
unknown.”); see also Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110−11 (Cal. 2005) (providing 
historical context that still stands, despite being reversed by AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion). 
44. See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern
Class Action, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 373, 396 (2005) (explaining that many attorneys began recommending 
CAAWs after large jury verdicts and deferential Supreme Court arbitration jurisprudence). 
45. The idea that the permissive language of “may” used in these agreements does not render
them mandatory is illusory; rarely, if ever, will a DCP prefer to litigate rather than arbitrate if the 
CAAW is enforceable. See Schwartz, supra note 36, at 60–67 (listing several reasons corporations 
prefer arbitration to litigation). 
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An example of such a CAAW in the Comcast Residential Services 
Agreement (which many readers have probably not thought twice about 
looking over) reads as follows: 
13. Binding Arbitration
a. Purpose. If you have a Dispute (as defined below) with Comcast that
cannot be resolved through an informal dispute resolution with 
Comcast, you or Comcast may elect to arbitrate that Dispute in 
accordance with the terms of this Arbitration Provision rather than 
litigate the Dispute in court. Arbitration means you will have a fair 
hearing before a neutral arbitrator instead of in a court by a judge or 
jury. Proceeding in arbitration may result in limited discovery and may 
be subject to limited review by courts. 
. . . 
f. Restrictions: . . . .
2. ALL PARTIES TO THE ARBITRATION MUST BE
INDIVIDUALLY NAMED. THERE SHALL BE NO RIGHT OR 
AUTHORITY FOR ANY CLAIMS TO BE ARBITRATED OR 
LITIGATED ON A CLASS ACTION OR CONSOLIDATED 
BASIS OR ON BASES INVOLVING CLAIMS BROUGHT IN A 
PURPORTED REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY ON BEHALF OF 
THE GENERAL PUBLIC (SUCH AS A PRIVATE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL), OTHER SUBSCRIBERS, OR OTHER PERSONS.46 
While arbitration is now the norm in most contracts, many DCPs 
confine their use of CAAWs to agreements with VCPs. A 2004 study 
found that 30.8% of the arbitration clauses they surveyed contained a class 
action preclusion mechanism.47 A more recent 2008 study found that while 
only 6% of non-consumer contracts contained arbitration clauses, 76.9% 
of consumer-DCP contracts contained arbitration clauses and every one of 
those clauses contained waivers for class-wide arbitration.48 
Some commentators contend that CAAWs are used to intentionally 
suppress claims. The authors of the 2008 study suggested that DCPs’ 
“selective use of arbitration clauses against consumers, but not against 
each other, suggests that their use of mandatory arbitration clauses may be 
based more on strategic advantage than on a belief that corporations are 
46. Comcast Agreement for Residential Services, Comcast, http://www.comcast.com/Corporate/
Customers/Policies/SubscriberAgreement.html (last visited June 1, 2014). As the reader can clearly see 
from this clause, some of the problems with arbitration explained in Part I.A.ii of this Note are noted 
in this clause itself. Comcast, like many other DCPs, permits consumers to opt out of the arbitration 
clause. However, the ability to opt-out is time-barred at thirty days. Due to the fact that most never 
read the fine print, few (if any) actually avoid arbitration. 
47. Demaine & Hensler, supra note 2, at 66. The authors surveyed arbitration clauses across
many industries, including financial services, insurance, retail services, healthcare, travel, and housing 
and home services. Id. at 63. 
48. Eisenberg et al., supra note 28, at 883–84. In addition, sixty percent of those clauses deemed
arbitration void if the arbitration process allowed for class-wide activity. Id. at 884. To place this in the 
context of avoiding collective activity as a whole through the FAA, the authors noted “[n]o litigation class 
action waivers were found in consumer or other contracts in the absence of an arbitration clause.” Id. 
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better serving their customers.”49 They further posited that “[t]he growth 
of mandatory consumer arbitration clauses appears to be part of a broader 
initiative by corporations to preclude or limit aggregate litigation.”50 Thus, 
an enforceable CAAW fully prevents aggregate recovery. 
Despite the already prevalent use of CAAWs in agreements with 
consumers, DCPs remained susceptible to the possibility that a court 
would invalidate an arbitration agreement due to the presence of a 
CAAW.51 Challenges swept through the lower courts, with plaintiff-
consumers anticipating that they would be foreclosed from arbitration due 
to cost.52 The claimants would initially assert claims in court and then 
oppose the inevitable motions to compel individual arbitration based on 
state or federal contract defenses. In 2011, the Supreme Court delivered 
the Concepcion opinion, dismissing California’s attempt to invalidate 
certain CAAWs as unconscionable.53 In 2013, with Italian Colors, the 
Supreme Court all but shut the door to CAAW challenges based on cost.54 
II. The Supreme Court Solidifies the Enforceability of CAAWs
The Supreme Court has struggled to balance the general purpose of
the FAA to “reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration 
49. Id. at 895; id. at 888 (“Companies prefer individual over aggregate dispute resolution because
aggregate treatment creates overwhelming settlement pressure and because few consumers will seek 
redress on an individual basis due to lack of information or the small amounts in dispute. Companies 
could attempt to address this problem by imposing waivers of class action litigation in their consumer 
contracts. But such waivers would be politically controversial and also would face a risk of being 
declared unconscionable by courts. The mandatory arbitration clause is a preferable alternative. Such 
clauses, if effective, may have the same result as class action waivers: they prevent class actions and 
remit consumers to individual actions which, in light of the stakes, are usually not worthwhile to 
pursue. But mandatory arbitration clauses are easier to sell and enforce than class action waivers. 
Because arbitration is often seen as cheaper and simpler than litigation, the company can claim that it 
is helping rather than hurting its customers. This reduces political costs and also increases the 
prospects that the clause will be upheld in court. In short, mandatory arbitration offers companies an 
opportunity to claim that they are concerned for consumer welfare while simultaneously denying their 
customers any practical avenue for redress.”). 
50. Id.; cf. Drahozal & Ware, supra note 34, at 472–75 (citing Theodore Eisenberg et al.,
Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and 
Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 871 (2008)) (explaining that the authors of Summer 
Soldiers only identified certain industries with higher than normal arbitration rates, and that concerns 
over class actions has not been definitively proven to be the explanation for the prevalence of 
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts). 
51. See Benjamin R. Dwyer & Christopher M. Mason, U.S. Supreme Court Upholds Class Action
Waivers in Consumer Contracts: AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, Nixon Peabody (Apr. 27, 2011), 
http://www.nixonpeabody.com/Supreme_Court_upholds_class_action_waivers_in_consumer_contracts; 
see also Class Action Waivers in Commercial and Consumer Arbitration Agreements After Concepcion, 
Bryan Cave (June 8, 2011), http://www.bryancave.com/files/Publication/35d9ae19-a177-4721-b601-
069566c842e8/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c5bccad8-16e3-49f5-9393-
092eb08305bf/Concepcion%20Client%20Alert.pdf. 
52. See Dwyer & Mason, supra note 51. 
53. See infra Part II.A.ii. 
54. See infra Part IV. 
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agreements”55 with the practical reality that arbitration must remain a fair 
alternative to the courts. The Court produced opinions reflecting such a 
dilemma, leaving litigants unsure whether arbitration clauses would 
remain enforceable if the arbitration’s costs precluded the potential for 
positive recovery by claimants. 
A. AT&T MOBILITY LLC V. CONCEPCION 
The FAA’s text provides one straightforward means to escape an 
arbitration provision. Known as the FAA’s “savings clause,” the last 
phrase of section 2 permits the invalidation of agreements to arbitrate 
“upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.”56 While the clause encompasses arguments based on state 
contract defenses, “[c]ourts may not invalidate arbitration agreements 
under state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions. . . . [because] 
Congress precluded States from singling out arbitration provisions for 
suspect status.”57 Therefore, state law can only invalidate arbitration 
provisions if the law is applied evenhandedly to all contracts.58 
1. The Discover Bank Rule
In California, courts are empowered by statute to refuse enforcement 
of unfairly one-sided or “unconscionable” contractual provisions.59 The 
“unconscionability [defense] has both a ‘procedural’ and a ‘substantive 
element,’ the former focusing on ‘oppression’ or ‘surprise’ due to unequal 
bargaining power, the latter on ‘overly harsh’ or ‘one-sided’ results.”60 As 
arbitration provisions proliferated in consumer contracts, California courts 
commonly used a far less stringent test to evaluate the “unconscionability” 
of arbitration provisions than to assess all other contracts.61 
In Discover Bank, the California Supreme Court determined that an 
arbitration provision was unenforceable because it contained a CAAW 
that would exculpate the defendant, Discover Bank, from small claim 
55. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991). 
56. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (referring to grounds such as fraud, duress, and unconscionability); see 
also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967) (explaining that the 
“savings clause” indicates that Congress intended the FAA to make arbitration agreements as 
enforceable as other contracts); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483–
84 (1989) (reiterating the Supreme Court’s interpretation that the FAA upholds arbitration 
agreements, except under the grounds mentioned in the savings clause). 
57. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
58. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (explaining that the
FAA “makes any such state policy unlawful” because it “would place arbitration clauses on an 
unequal ‘footing,’ directly contrary to the Act’s language and Congress’ intent”). 
59. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1670.5 (West 2008) (codifying the principal that a court can refuse to
enforce an unconscionable provision in a contract); see also Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 702 P.2d 
503, 511 (Cal. 1985). 
60. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000) (citations omitted). 
61. See generally Broome, supra note 35. 
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liability.62 The Discover Bank court noted that the CAAW acted to 
“deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small 
sums of money” because no consumer would rationally bring an individual 
claim.63 The court determined that CAAWs are “unconscionable” if they 
“operate to insulate a party from liability that otherwise would be 
imposed under California law.”64 
2. Concepcion Overrules Discover Bank
The Discover Bank rule did not withstand scrutiny from the United 
States Supreme Court for long. In Concepcion, two AT&T customers 
sought to avoid individual arbitration of their state-law fraud and false 
advertising claims in federal court.65 The district court denied the motion 
to compel arbitration, relying on the Discover Bank rule.66 The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed, additionally holding that the FAA did not preempt the 
rule because the Discover Bank rule was a “refinement of the 
unconscionability analysis applicable to contracts generally in California.”67 
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the FAA preempted the 
Discover Bank rule, rejecting Concepcion’s argument against 
enforceability of the CAAW.68 Specifically, the Concepcion Court 
determined that the Discover Bank rule was inconsistent with the FAA 
and therefore preempted because it fundamentally altered the written 
arbitration agreement when it required the availability of class-wide 
arbitration.69 The Court highlighted some key problems that arise when 
parties are forced to shift from bilateral to class action arbitration: 
decreased efficiency of the process, the need for procedural formality, 
increased risk to defendants, and limited opportunity for appeal.70 
In response to the dissent’s claims that class action arbitration may 
be necessary to prevent small claims from slipping through the cracks, 
62. 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005) (“[W]hen the [CAAW] is found in a consumer contract of
adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small 
amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has 
carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums 
of money, then, at least to the extent the obligation at issue is governed by California law, the waiver 
becomes in practice the exemption of the party ‘from responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury 
to the person or property of another.’ (Civ. Code, § 1668). Under these circumstances, such waivers 
are unconscionable under California law and should not be enforced.”). 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 1109. 
65. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1749, 1774 (2011).
66. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. o5-1167, 2008 WL 5216255, at *1 (S.D. Cal Aug. 11, 2008) 
(holding that the arbitration provision was unconscionable because AT&T failed to show that the 
arbitration adequately substituted for the deterrent effects of class actions). 
67. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Shroyer v. New
Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 2007)).  
68. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
69. Id. at 1748–49 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
70. Id. at 1752–53. 
June 2014]   ARBITRATION AT THE TIPPING POINT 1453 
the Court strongly emphasized that “[s]tates cannot require a procedure 
that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated 
reasons.”71 In addition, the Court noted that AT&T’s arbitration clause 
was extremely claimant-friendly, and that, due to beneficial fee-shifting 
provisions, small claims brought individually would likely be resolved.72 
Therefore, there was no risk that the claimants would end up in the red if 
they engaged in individual arbitration with AT&T.73 
Concepcion established that the FAA preempted state-law doctrines 
designed to invalidate agreements to arbitrate, regardless of the public 
policy concerns they are designed to serve.74 Thus, plaintiffs were left 
only to rely on either state law applicable equally to all contracts or 
federal law to challenge the enforceability of a CAAW. Until recently, 
federal common law permitted cost-based challenges to CAAWs under a 
doctrine first enunciated in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. 
Randolph as the “effective vindication of statutory rights.”75 
B. The “Vindication of Statutory Rights” Doctrine 
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court issued a string of decisions that 
ostensibly left the door open to challenging CAAWs when arbitration of 
federal claims would be too costly to undertake as an individual.76 The 
litigation theory went that if a party to a dispute governed by an 
arbitration provision had no incentive to bring a federal cause of action 
due to high fees and net-negative potential recovery, then the arbitration 
itself would effectively deny that individual the ability to vindicate his or 
her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum. 
71. Id. at 1753. 
72. Id. The clause provided that AT&T would pay claimants a minimum of $7500 and twice their
attorney’s fees if the claimant obtained an arbitration award greater than AT&T’s last settlement 
award. The district court, Ninth Circuit, and Supreme Court all agreed that the arbitration clause 
inured to the customer’s benefit due to these beneficial terms. Id.; see Stipanowich, supra note 5, at 371 
(noting that the Court selected an arbitration provision with “an artful eye to the desired (and 
eventual) result”). The clause has been widely praised and many commentators have weighed in on 
how to model consumer arbitration clauses after AT&T’s to avoid court challenges to their 
enforceability. See, e.g., Yvette Ostolaza, Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Financial 
Services Contracts, BNA Class Action Litig. Rep. (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/2012_cccle_materials/9_1.authcheckdam.pdf; 
Arthur J. Rooney, How Safe Is Your Arbitration Agreement Post-AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 
Seyfarth Shaw Client Alerts (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.seyfarth.com/ publications/SI010612. 
73. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1749, 1753 (2011). The majority cited the
Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Laster that aggrieved customers who filed claims would be “essentially 
guarantee[d]” to be made whole in the arbitration scheme. See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 
584 F.3d 849, 856 n.9 (9th Cir. 2009). 
74. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
75. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2315 (2013); see also infra Part II.B. 
76. See generally Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); 
Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
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With arbitration provisions spreading to all sorts of contracts, the 
Supreme Court repeatedly heard cases that dealt with whether federal 
statutory claims could be appropriately resolved through arbitration.77 In 
every case, the Court answered in the affirmative, permitting the 
underlying federal claims to be subject to arbitration absent congressional 
intent to require court access.78 However, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Court qualified the expansive use of 
arbitration, stating that “so long as the prospective litigant effectively 
may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum,” that 
federal statute’s purpose would continue to be served and arbitration 
would be permitted.79 
In Mitsubishi Motors, the plaintiff worried that the international 
arbitrator would not apply treble damages in an antitrust action.80 The 
Court explained that there was no reason to assume that international 
arbitration would not provide adequate relief, but if arbitration indeed 
operated “as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory 
remedies for antitrust violations, [the Court] would have little hesitation 
in condemning the agreement as against public policy.”81 This precedent 
gave cost-based challenges a lifeline. 
The Court revisited the “effective vindication” doctrine, as it relates 
to arbitration, in 2000.82 In Green Tree, the plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant, Green Tree, violated the Truth in Lending Act83 and the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act84 by failing to disclose an additional insurance 
charge.85 The plaintiff challenged Green Tree’s motion to compel 
arbitration pursuant to Green Tree’s standard lending arbitration clause 
because “she lacked the resources to arbitrate, and as a result, would 
have to forgo her claims against [Green Tree].”86 The Court rejected her 
argument because the agreement did not expressly delineate costs, and 
77. See generally Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: Examining “Consumer-Friendly”
Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 Notre Dame L. Rev. 825 (2012). 
78. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991) (finding that Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 claims could be arbitrated); Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (finding that Securities Act of 1933 claims were 
arbitrable); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987) (concluding that 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claims 
were arbitrable); Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 629 (permitting arbitration of Sherman Act claims); 
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24−25 (1983) (determining that the 
FAA is a congressional determination that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues 
should be resolved in favor of arbitration”).  
79. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 637. 
80. Id. at 635. 
81. Id. at 637 n.19. 
82. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 79 (2000). 
83. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–16 (2012).
84. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–91(f) (2000). 
85. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 83. 
86. Id. at 83–84. 
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she therefore failed to carry her burden to show that the arbitration was 
cost prohibitive.87 
However, the Green Tree Court provided a legal theory upon which 
to base future challenges to arbitration provisions, writing that where “a 
party seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that 
arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden 
of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs.”88 The Court had never 
before endorsed the concept that an arbitration provision could be 
defeated on the basis of excessive cost.89 The Green Tree Court established 
that if the plaintiff made a sufficient factual showing, then the court could 
potentially invalidate the arbitration agreement for being cost-prohibitive. 
III. Confusion Among the Circuits After CONCEPCION
Prior to Concepcion, lower courts generally applied Green Tree to 
arbitration clauses containing various waivers, including CAAWs.90 
However, those courts often found the plaintiff unable to meet the high 
burden of proof necessary for Green Tree to apply.91 Only one circuit court 
pre-Concepcion invalidated a CAAW under the Green Tree doctrine, 
severing the clause from the original agreement.92 After Concepcion, 
87. Id. at 91–92. 
88. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000);. 
89. Stephen G. Harvey, Decision in the Green Tree Case a Victory for Lenders and Borrowers, 
Pepper Hamilton LLP (Jan. 11, 2001), http://www.pepperlaw.com/ 
publications_article.aspx?ArticleKey=74 (“Although the Court’s ruling upheld the use of arbitration 
clauses in consumer finance contracts, it should not be read as a signal that the Court will permit 
arbitration agreements that foist excessive arbitration costs on consumers.”). 
90. See, e.g., In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 285 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[I]f a party could
demonstrate that the prohibition on class actions likely would make arbitration prohibitively expensive, 
such a showing could invalidate and agreement.”); Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir. 
2007) (agreeing with the Kristian court’s determination that the enforceability of a particular CAAW 
includes an inquiry into “the cost to an individual plaintiff of vindicating the claim when compared to the 
plaintiff’s potential recovery”); Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 54 (1st Cir. 2006) (severing the 
CAAW and determining that the class ban on arbitration would undoubtedly preclude the plaintiff from 
vindicating his federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum due to high costs). Compare Booker v. Robert 
Half Int’l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (reaffirming the applicability of the Green Tree test, while 
noting that the party resisting arbitration bears a high burden of showing that the terms of the arbitration 
interfere with effective vindication of statutory rights, and that burden cannot be satisfied by “mere 
speculation”), with Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1234 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(“[A]n arbitration agreement that prohibits use of the judicial forum as a means of resolving statutory 
claims must also provide for an effective and accessible alternative forum.”). 
91. See, e.g., Hill v. Ricoh Ams. Corp., 603 F.3d 766, 780 (10th Cir. 2010) (referring to Green 
Tree’s high threshold to explain that plaintiff failed to meet its burden); Cicle v. Chase Bank USA, 
583 F.3d 549, 556–57 (8th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the plaintiff had not submitted sufficient evidence 
to satisfy the Green Tree standard); In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 50 F.3d at 285 (acknowledging 
the validity of cost-based challenges to arbitration but concluding the plaintiff had not adequately 
established such a challenge); Lowry v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 4:12-0816, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 128907, at *8–9 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 12, 2012) (rejecting plaintiff’s cost-based argument because 
he provided a “mere estimate” that did not satisfy his burden). 
92. Kristian, 446 F.3d. at 64. 
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circuit courts have split on the issue of whether factually supported cost-
based challenges could render CAAW’s unenforceable, applying either 
Green Tree’s vindication of statutory rights doctrine or Concepcion’s 
mandate of strict adherence to the FAA without regard to policy, or 
cost-based, concerns. 
A. The Majority of Lower Courts Follow CONCEPCION 
The majority of circuit courts concluded that Concepcion rejected 
cost-based challenges to CAAWs, therefore eliminating the Green Tree 
arbitration challenge.93 In Coneff v. AT&T Corp., the plaintiff asserted 
both state unjust enrichment and breach of contract claims as well as 
violations of the Federal Communications Act against defendant AT&T.94 
The Coneff court found the “vindication of statutory rights” argument 
unpersuasive and granted the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, 
observing that Concepcion had rejected “such unrelated policy concerns, 
however worthwhile, [because they] cannot undermine the FAA.”95 
Other circuit court decisions track similar reasoning. The Eleventh 
Circuit dealt with a challenge to the same plaintiff-friendly AT&T 
arbitration clause after plaintiffs asserted state causes of action on behalf 
of a class.96 The court rejected a Florida law voiding CAAWs as against 
public policy despite an evidentiary showing by the plaintiffs that they 
could not obtain adequate representation individually.97 The court noted 
that “[t]he Plaintiffs’ evidence goes only to substantiating the very public 
policy arguments that were expressly rejected by . . . Concepcion—
namely, that the class action waiver will be exculpatory, because most of 
these small-value claims will go undetected and unprosecuted.”98 This 
93. See, e.g., Homa v. Am. Express Co., 494 F. App’x 191 (3d Cir. 2012); Quillion v. Tenet
HealthSystem Phila., Inc., 673 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2012); Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1157 
(9th Cir. 2012); Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2011). 
94. Coneff, 673 F.3d at 1157. 
95. Id. at 1159 (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1749, 1753 (2011)). 
96. Cruz, 648 F.3d at 1206. 
97. Id. at 1214. 
98. Id. The Eleventh Circuit also noted that Concepcion foreclosed challenges to CAAW’s under
the unconscionability doctrine. Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 691 F.3d 1224, 1233–34 (11th Cir. 2012). 
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line of reasoning is commonplace among circuit courts99 and some district 
courts in circuits that have yet to confront the issue on appeal.100 
B. The Second Circuit Follows GREEN TREE 
On the other side of the split, the Second Circuit distinguished 
Concepcion and applied Green Tree to invalidate a cost-prohibitive 
CAAW. In In re American Express Merchant’s Litigation (“AMEX I”), a 
group of merchants who contracted with American Express (“AMEX”) 
filed a class action suit against AMEX, alleging a “tying” violation of 
antitrust law.101 The Second Circuit held that the merchants had met their 
Green Tree burden by showing that, if forced into individual arbitration, 
each merchant would have to finance an economic antitrust study that 
could run from “about $300 thousand to more than $2 million.”102 The 
court further found that, if successful, an individual plaintiff could only 
expect an average damages reward between $9,046 and $38,549.103 The 
AMEX I court concluded that AMEX’s CAAW could not be enforced 
“because to do so would grant AMEX de facto immunity from antitrust 
liability by removing the plaintiffs’ only reasonably feasible means of 
recovery.”104 
After two rounds of re-analyzing the case to incorporate newly issued 
Supreme Court decisions, the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, finally 
99. See, e.g., Homa v. Am. Express Co., 494 F. App’x 191, 196 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted)
(“Even if Homa cannot effectively prosecute his claim in an individual arbitration that procedure is his 
only remedy, illusory or not. Though some persons might regard our result as unfair, [the FAA] 
requires that we reach it.”); Quillion v. Tenet HealthSystem Phila., Inc., 673 F.3d 221, 232 (3d Cir. 
2012) (explaining that if an agreement explicitly contained a CAAW, a Pennsylvania law prohibiting 
CAAW’s would be preempted by the FAA after Concepcion); Bellows v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 
No. 09-1951, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48237, at *11 (S.D. Cal. May 4, 2011) (rejecting plaintiffs 
contention that the agreement to arbitrate was substantively unconscionable because it included a 
CAAW in light of Concepcion). 
 100. See, e.g., Dean v. Draughons Junior Coll., Inc., 917 F. Supp. 2d 751, 673 (M.D. Tenn. 2013) 
(explaining that state law cost-prohibitiveness defenses are precluded after Concepcion); King v. Capital 
One Bank (USA), N.A., No. 3:11-0068, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163562, at *24–25 (W.D. Va. Nov. 15, 
2012) (explaining Concepcion forecloses the argument that CAAW’s “make it more difficult to pursue 
small claims”); Brokers’ Servs. Mktg. Grp. v. Cellco P’ship, No. 10-3973, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42721, at 
*12–14 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2012) (rejecting plaintiffs’ vindication of statutory rights defense because
Concepcion foreclosed unrelated policy concerns); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett, No. 3:10-0248, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23947, at *40 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 24, 2012) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that a class 
arbitration should be permitted even though it would be “impractical” to pursue [their claims] 
independently); Jasso v. Money Mart Express, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (granting 
defendant’s motion to compel because the plaintiff’s cost-based defense cannot survive Concepcion). 
 101. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., No. 03-9592, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11742, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 16, 2006). Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that they were forced to accept all American Express 
cards if they chose to accept the charge card. Id. 
102. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 316 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 103. Id. at 317. These numbers include the standard treble damages awarded in antitrust cases. See 
15 U.S.C. § 15 (2014). 
104. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 554 F.3d at 320. 
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affirmed its ruling in AMEX I and denied rehearing (“AMEX IV”).105 The 
court reiterated that Concepcion does not address federal statutory rights 
and is instead wholly focused on the issue of preemption of state law by 
federal law.106 The Second Circuit was unequivocal about the continuing 
vitality of Green Tree, explaining that its decision to invalidate the 
CAAW “gives full effect to a long line of Supreme Court precedent 
preserving plaintiffs’ ability to vindicate federal statutory rights, rather 
than eviscerating more than 120 years of antitrust law by closing the 
courthouse door to all but the most well-funded plaintiffs.”107 
The AMEX IV court distinguished Concepcion and Coneff further by 
explaining that, whereas the plaintiffs there lacked adequate “incentive” to 
arbitrate their claims individually, “the fee-shifting provisions ensured that 
a damaged plaintiff could be made whole.”108 In contrast, the court 
explained that the AMEX plaintiffs did not lack incentive to arbitrate; 
rather, they were faced with such substantial upfront expenditures that 
the only economically feasible means to enforce their statutory rights was 
by class action.109 No fee-shifting provisions were available to ever make 
the plaintiffs whole.110 In the fall of 2012, the Supreme Court granted 
AMEX’s petition for certiorari to resolve the circuit split.111 
IV. ITALIAN COLORS Radically Alters the Arbitration Landscape
Many commentators accurately predicted that the Supreme Court
would use the Italian Colors case to reverse the Second Circuit and refine 
the scope of the Green Tree doctrine.112 Indeed, the deck seemed stacked 
against the plaintiffs because Justice Sotomayor, a Concepcion dissenter, 
was forced to recuse herself because she was part of the opinion below.113 
The result was exactly as predicted. 
105. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2012). 
106. Id. at 140. 
107. Id. at 142. 
108. Id. at 141. 
109. Id. Interestingly, the Coneff court actually noted the incentive/feasibility distinction had some 
merit in its decision. See Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1159 n.3 (9th Cir. 2012). 
110. Id. 
111. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012). 
112. See, e.g., Archis A. Parasharami, Supreme Court Appears Poised to Reject Second Circuit’s 
Articulation of “Effective Vindication of Federal Statutory Rights” Defense for Avoiding Class 
Arbitration Waivers, Mayer Brown (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.classdefenseblog.com/2013/02/28/ 
supreme-court-appears-poised-to-reject-second-circuits-articulation-of-effective-vindication-of-
federal-statutory-rights-defense-for-avoiding-class-arbitration-waivers; SCOTUS Hears Argument in 
American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant, Wage Law (Mar. 1, 2013), 
http://www.californiawagelaw.com/wage_law/2013/03/scotus-hears-argument-in-american-express-v-
italian-colors-restaurant.html; Oral Argument in Italian Colors, Workplace Prof Blog (Mar. 1, 2013), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2013/03/oral-argument-in-italian-colors.html. 
 113. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 667 F.3d at 206; see Rebecca S. Bjork et al., Supreme Court 
Argument in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, Seyfarth Shaw (Feb. 27, 2013), 
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Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia explained that the judge-made 
“effective vindication” doctrine could not provide the Italian Colors 
plaintiffs with relief from individual arbitration with AMEX.114 The Court 
noted that Green Tree remained a viable defense when “a provision in an 
arbitration agreement [forbade] the assertion of certain statutory rights” 
and would “perhaps cover filing and administrative fees attached to 
arbitration that are so high as to make access to the forum 
impracticable.”115 However, “the fact that it is not worth the expense 
involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination 
of the right to pursue that remedy.”116 
Thus, the majority drew a distinction between arbitration clauses 
that prevent the right to pursue a remedy, which courts may invalidate, 
and arbitration clauses that increase the expense involved in proving a 
violation, which do not implicate the “effective vindication” doctrine.117 
The Italian Colors Court went on to note that Concepcion rejected the 
notion that “class arbitration was necessary to prosecute claims ‘that 
might otherwise slip through the legal system.’”118 
The dissent, led by Justice Kagan, did not mince words when it 
explained the consequences of the majority’s decision. The CAAW at 
issue “impose[d] a variety of procedural bars that would make pursuit of 
the antitrust claim a fool’s errand. . . . [i]f the arbitration clause is 
enforceable, [AMEX] has insulated itself from antitrust liability—even if 
it has in fact violated the law.”119 The “effective vindication” doctrine was 
created to “prevent arbitration clauses from choking off a plaintiff’s 
ability to enforce congressionally created rights.”120 
The dissent continued that if the “effective vindication” rule only 
prohibits contractual clauses that expressly exculpate a DCP from liability, 
then “companies have every incentive to draft their agreements to extract 
backdoor waivers of statutory rights, making arbitration unavailable or 
pointless.”121 The dissent argued that the majority’s rule created a scenario 
that Congress likely did not envision while passing the FAA: DCPs can 
use arbitration provisions to foreclose would-be claimants from both the 
courts and arbitration.122 
http://www.seyfarth.com/publications/2664 (“Justice Sotomayor recused herself as a member of the 
Second Circuit Panel who issued the decision below.”) 
114. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310−11 (2013).  
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 2311. 
117. Id. (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1749, 1753 (2011)). 
118. Id. at 2312. 
119. Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
120. Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
121. Id. at 2315 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
122. Id. at 2317. 
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V.  Possible Challenges and a Proposed Way Forward 
If the costs associated with pursuing individual arbitration outweigh 
a claimant’s potential recovery, pursuit of even meritorious claims is 
irrational. Class action lawsuits remedy this inequitable situation in the 
litigation context by allowing the aggregation of claims to lessen each 
plaintiff’s individual costs.123 Because CAAWs are disproportionately 
inserted into contracts by DCPs,124 individual plaintiffs must find some 
legal doctrine upon which to challenge the arbitration clause or the 
CAAW itself. Otherwise, the VCP is left without a viable claim and the 
DCP reaps a windfall by doing no more than inserting specific language 
into its standard agreement. After Concepcion and Italian Colors, few 
avenues remain realistic. This Part discusses some potential challenges to 
mandatory arbitration and the likelihood those challenges can be applied 
to successfully overcome CAAWs. 
A. State-Law Preemption and Federal-Law Conflict 
In Concepcion, the Supreme Court outlined the preemption analysis 
that lower courts must undertake when considering challenges to 
arbitration clauses involving state and federal law claims. Lower courts 
considering state law that conflicts with the FAA have routinely rejected 
state-law challenges to arbitration in light of Concepcion. Likewise, 
recent Supreme Court guidance suggests that federal statutes will rarely 
override the FAA when in conflict. 
1. State-Law Challenges
Concepcion reiterated that the FAA per se displaces state laws 
prohibiting outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim.125 The 
inquiry becomes more complex “when a doctrine normally thought to be 
generally applicable . . . is alleged to have been applied in a fashion that 
disfavors arbitration.”126 In theory, a VCP seeking to overcome a claim-
suppressing CAAW could rely on the state legislature or state common 
law on the narrow grounds Concepcion permits. However, lower courts 
 123. See supra notes 25–27; see also Stephen H. Kupperman & George C. Freeman III, Selected 
Topics in Securities Arbitration: Rule 15c2-2, Fraud, Duress, Unconscionability, Waiver, Class 
Arbitration, Punitive Damages, Rights of Review, and Attorney’s Fees and Costs, 65 Tul. L. Rev 1547, 
1579 (1990) (“The class action also provides a remedy for those whose claims are too small to justify 
the expense of individual litigation. In this way it allows an opportunity to vindicate rights, while 
simultaneously encouraging action that may help effectuate policies underlying substantive statutes.”). 
124. See supra notes 33–34. 
125. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011). 
126. Id. 
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after Concepcion generally avoid state-law challenges unless they apply 
even handedly to other contract disputes as required by Concepcion.127 
Many federal and state courts read Concepcion as foreclosing state 
laws conflicting with the FAA. The Supreme Court in Marmet Health 
Care Center, Inc. v. Clayton Brown reversed a West Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals ruling that the FAA did not preempt the state’s public 
policy against pre-dispute arbitration agreements in personal injury or 
wrongful death claims against nursing homes.128 
Similarly, in Robinson v. Title Lenders, Inc., the Missouri Supreme 
Court explained that “the FAA does not allow state-law policy 
considerations to be used to invalidate an arbitration agreement.”129 Other 
courts have followed this preemption analysis.130 State-law challenges 
based on statutes or common law that invalidate or obstruct arbitration 
provisions are not likely to survive post-Concepcion preemption. 
However, state-law doctrines that apply to contracts generally still 
remain a viable means to invalidate arbitration provisions or CAAWs. In 
Chavarria v. Ralphs, the Ninth Circuit relied on an “unconscionability” 
analysis to invalidate the CAAW embedded in Ralph’s Grocery’s 
employment application.131 The Chavarria court noted that Concepcion 
foreclosed the “unconscionability” doctrine when it applied 
disproportionately to arbitration provisions.132 
The court went on to note the egregious procedural and substantive 
“unconscionability” of Ralph’s arbitration provision and specifically 
concluded that the high up-front costs made access to the forum 
impracticable—the exact situation that the Italian Colors majority 
explained might permit invalidation.133 The court found that the FAA did 
not preempt its “unconscionability” analysis because the law “is not 
 127. See, e.g., Lau v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 11-1940, 2012 WL 370557 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 
2012) (finding an arbitration’s costs and appeal provision unconscionable). 
128. Marmet Health Care Center, Inc., v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1204 (2012). 
129. Robinson v. Title Lenders, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 505, 516 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).  
130. See Kilgore v. Keybank, Nat’l Ass’n, 673 F.3d 947, 960 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that the FAA 
preempts the Broughton-Cruz rule, which prohibited outright the arbitration claims where the plaintiff 
is functioning as a private attorney general on behalf of the general public, after Concepcion), vacated, 
rev’d, remanded en banc, Kilgore v. Keybank, Nat’l Ass’n, 718 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013); see also 
Ferguson v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 733 F.3d 928, 938 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The FAA preempts California’s 
Broughton-Cruz rule that claims for public injunctive relief cannot be arbitrated.”); Schnuerle v. 
Insight Commc’ns, Co., 376 S.W.3d 561, 564−65 (Ky. 2012) (concluding that Concepcion preempted a 
state policy invalidating contractual waivers of class action participation where it was based on de 
minimis claims which are unlikely to be individually litigated). In addition, in light of Concepcion the 
California Supreme Court was forced to reconsider their decision holding that a state-law rule finding 
arbitration clauses that contain Berman Waivers (providing speedy and informal method to resolve 
wage claims) unconscionable was not preempted. Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (Frank B.) 
No. S174475, 2012 Cal. LEXIS 871 (Cal. Jan. 11, 2012). 
131. Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2013). 
132. Id. at 921. 
133. Id. at 927. 
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unfavorable towards arbitration, but instead reflects a generally applicable 
policy against abuses of bargaining power.”134 At least in the Ninth Circuit, 
then, state-law challenges can avoid preemption if courts can rationalize 
that they apply to all contracts generally.135 However, state-law challenges 
must be narrowly tailored and are now generally disfavored by courts 
hearing such arguments. 
2. Federal-Law Challenges
When a federal statute conflicts with permitting the arbitration of 
certain types of claims, the analysis is more complex. The Supreme Court 
previously highlighted the importance of enforcing arbitration agreements 
by their terms “unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude 
a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.”136 Therefore, 
if a VCP has a federal statutory claim that requires adjudication in the 
courts, she may be able to overcome a CAAW because arbitration in 
general is disallowed. 
In CompuCredit v. Greenwood, the Supreme Court outlined the 
analysis to apply when a federal statutory claim seemingly prevents 
arbitration of a dispute, in conflict with the FAA.137 The Court explained 
that when a federal statutory claim is silent as to whether the claim may 
be arbitrated, if an arbitration agreement governs the dispute, the claim 
must be submitted to arbitration per the FAA.138 Thus, the CompuCredit 
Court established the FAA as the default, requiring other federal 
statutory claims to expressly preclude arbitration in its text. Only a few 
statutes expressly disallow pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate their 
corresponding claims.139 
In the employment context, lower courts have unanimously agreed 
that the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”),140 a federal statute 
designed to protect the rights of employees in the private sector, does not 
preclude the use of CAAWs.141 In In re D.R. Horton, Inc., an employee 
134. Id.  
 135. See Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 188 (Cal. 2013) (holding that the 
“unconscionability” doctrine may continue to invalidate arbitration agreements after Italian Colors 
and Concepcion that are unreasonably one-sided). 
136. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). 
137. CompuCredit v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012). 
138. Id. at 673. 
139. See Martin H. Malin, The Arbitration Fairness Act: It Need Not and Should Not Be an All or 
Nothing Proposition, 87 Ind. L.J. 289, 289 (2012) (noting that both the Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act prohibit pre-
dispute agreements to arbitrate specific types of claims); see also Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract 
Arbitration Fairness Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (2012). 
140. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012). 
 141. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 364 (5th Cir. 2013); see Richards v. Ernst & Young 
LLP, 734 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2013); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 296 (2d Cir. 
2013); Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that arbitration 
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of D.R. Horton alleged that the CAAW previously agreed to violated his 
§ 7 NLRA right to engage in concerted legal action addressing wage,
hours, or other working conditions.142 The National Labor Relations 
Board agreed, holding that employers cannot compel employees to “waive 
their NLRA right to collectively pursue litigation of employment claims in 
all forums, arbitral or judicial.”143 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit explained 
that CompuCredit required explicit language of congressional intent to 
override the FAA.144 The court noted it was “loath to create a circuit 
split,” and concluded that the rights of collective action under the NLRA 
did not evince a congressional intent to preclude application of the 
FAA.145 
Unless the plaintiff’s federal statutory claim explicitly requires court 
access, courts must enforce the arbitration agreement under the FAA.146 
Despite the contention that Concepcion only stands for the preemption 
of state statutes that conflict with the FAA, the CompuCredit Court 
raised the bar slightly higher when asserting federal claims and objecting 
to individual arbitration in opposition to the FAA.147 Neither state nor 
federal law is a safe bet in opposing an arbitration provision and avoiding 
the preclusive effects of a CAAW. 
B. Federal Legislation 
After Concepcion and Italian Colors, a workable and equitable 
solution must be found to provide a remedy in situations in which 
CAAWs work an obvious injustice. Congressional action is the best 
option to avoid the inequitable, claim-suppressing effect of CAAWs. 
Congress should establish a workable rule for courts to follow, limiting 
whatever impact these decisions have on CAAWs. Despite current 
congressional gridlock on most issues, the protection of VCPs in 
agreements containing arbitration clauses should be a policy Congress as 
a whole can endorse. If the FAA is to continue its purpose of placing 
agreements containing class waivers are enforceable in claims brought under the FLSA); see also 
Jeffrey T. Johnson, Ninth Circuit Joins Growing Trend: Declines to Follow D.R. Horton and Upholds 
Arbitration Agreement Prohibiting Class Claims, Employers’ Lawyers Blog (Aug. 26, 2013), 
http://www.employerslawyersblog.com/2013/08/ninth-circuit-declines-follow-drhorton-upholding-
arbitration-agreement-prohibiting-class-claims-flsa-class-waiver.html. 
 142. In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at *2, 2012–2013 NLRB Dec. ¶ 15546 (Jan. 3, 
2012); section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (the “NLRA”), in pertinent part, requires that 
employees have the right “to engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining 
or other mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 143. In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. at *12 (“So long as the employer leaves open a judicial 
forum for class and collective claims, employees’ NLRA rights are preserved without requiring the 
availability of classwide arbitration.”). 
144. D.R. Horton, Inc., 737 F.3d at 360. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 361. 
147. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 672–73 (2012). 
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arbitration on the same footing as the courts, actual access to justice 
within that system is necessary. 
1. The Arbitration Fairness Act
In a press release immediately following the Concepcion decision, 
Senators Al Franken, Richard Blumenthal, and Representative Hank 
Johnson announced they were going to reintroduce the Arbitration 
Fairness Act (“AFA”).148 They decried Concepcion as “another example 
of the Supreme Court favoring corporations over consumers.”149 The 
AFA, according to its sponsors, rectifies Concepcion’s detrimental effect 
by “eliminat[ing] forced arbitration clauses in employment, consumer, 
and civil rights cases” and “allow[ing] consumers and workers to choose 
arbitration after a dispute occurred.”150 However, the Act has languished 
in the Committee on the Judiciary since 2011 and has little hope of ever 
reaching a full vote.151 
The AFA is a flawed response to CAAWs because it is overbroad. 
The AFA would invalidate the claimant-friendly arbitration provisions 
such as the AT&T provision present in Concepcion. The Concepcion 
Court noted that the district court concluded that the plaintiffs were in fact 
better off under the arbitration agreement than they would have been in a 
class action lawsuit because the claimants were essentially guaranteed to 
be made whole.152 If enacted, the AFA would prevent what Myriam Gilles 
calls “consumer friendly arbitration clauses”—clauses specifically designed 
to “provide courts with comfort that the elimination of aggregate 
procedures will not serve to prevent the vindication of rights.”153 
The companies that adopt “consumer friendly” provisions give the 
claimant the ability to vindicate her rights, and in theory provide a race 
to the top in terms of VCP-beneficial arbitration provisions instead of an 
outright ban on rights vindication.154 CAAWs can still benefit the 
individual because, in order to stave off court challenges, companies will 
rationally choose to make their individual arbitration procedures more 
beneficial to claimants and eliminate the argument that binding arbitration 
 148. Press Release, Sen. Franken, Sens. Franken, Blumenthal, Rep. Hank Johnson Announce 
Legislation Giving Consumers More Power in the Courts Against Corporations (Apr. 27, 2011), 
available at http://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1466. 
149. Id. 
150. Id.  
151. H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011); see Christopher Drahozal, Concepcion and the Arbitration 
Fairness Act, SCOTUSblog (Sept. 13, 2011, 11:46 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/ 
concepcion-and-the-arbitration-fairness-act. 
152. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
153. Gilles, supra note 77, at 829, 844. 
154. Id. at 865. 
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is unjust. This does not prevent vindication of rights, and keeps intact all of 
the benefits of arbitration discussed earlier.155 
Any federal legislation should be narrowed to specifically invalidate 
CAAWs that act as a Hobson’s choice for claimants: abandon meritorious 
claims or face overwhelming, unrecoverable costs to obtain any relief. 
2. FAA Amendment or Similar Federal Legislation
In order to avoid the pitfalls that would follow from an outright ban 
on arbitration in consumer and employment contexts, Congress instead 
should either amend the FAA or introduce new legislation aimed directly 
at CAAWs that prevent the claimant from actually utilizing the arbitral 
forum. The distinction drawn by the Italian Colors Court between the 
right to pursue a claim and the costs involved with proving a claim is 
irrelevant to VCPs because the result will always end up the same: the 
contractual language immunizes the drafter from liability. Consumers do 
not care that they can still theoretically assert their rights. If it makes no 
economic sense to do so, then they will not even consider asserting a 
claim and the DCP escapes without incurring any cost. 
The statutory language should provide that any arbitration provision 
barring collective or class action is unenforceable upon a factual showing 
by the claimant. The claimant should demonstrate by a preponderance of 
the evidence that individual arbitration would require said claimant to 
incur substantial, unrecoverable costs greatly outweighing the potential 
recovery and rendering arbitration impractical.156 This could easily be 
inserted in the FAA’s savings clause, adding to the grounds upon which 
an agreement can be invalidated.157 
Significant discretion should be left to the trial court judge to 
determine whether the plaintiff has met her burden. Such an inquiry will 
not invade the province of the arbitrator. This legislation will give the 
judge the same level of discretion authorized under the FAA when a 
judge is tasked with considering state-law defenses such as fraud, duress, 
or unconscionability.158 
District courts have made this exact same cost-based inquiry many 
times before, and past experience shows that the threshold will remain 
155. See supra notes 18–20. 
 156. Such a situation will arise when the plaintiffs are faced with substantial upfront expenditures 
to prosecute their claims, meaning the only economically feasible means of doing so is through a class 
procedure. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 681 F.3d 139, 141 (2012). This can be distinguished from 
the situation in both Coneff and Concepcion because, while “the individual damages awards available 
to any single plaintiff were small . . . the fee-shifting provisions insured that a damaged plaintiff could 
be made whole. The reason that a plaintiff may not bring a suit was not because he would not be likely 
to recoup his costs, but rather because the small amount of damages was not worth his trouble.” Id. 
157. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
158. Id. 
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high.159 This legislation will allow lower courts to compel arbitration 
according to “consumer-friendly” arbitration clauses160 while striking 
cost-prohibitive CAAWs and allowing plaintiffs to proceed in the only 
economically rational manner: a court-certified class action lawsuit. 
One argument raised by opponents of the vindication of statutory 
rights doctrine is that plaintiffs will attempt evade CAAWs by 
manufacturing an affidavit or choosing pricey attorneys to increase their 
upfront costs.161 This argument carries little weight because a cost-
prohibitive situation will arise only in certain types of claims, such as 
antitrust claims,162 and the courts are “perfectly capable of doing the 
analysis necessary to determine if the plaintiffs have made the necessary 
showing.”163 If lower courts are tasked with determining the scope of the 
class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a quite complex initial 
task, they should be able to handle this similar inquiry. 
This proposed legislation would have the dual effect of pushing 
contract drafting to a more claimant-friendly end product while providing 
certainty to a DCP that if they draft arbitration agreements that prevent 
individual redress, that agreement will be invalidated and the DCP will 
face a class action lawsuit. In the end, this should restore some faith in the 
arbitration system that consumers now credibly view as merely a 
corporate means of self-immunization. 
Conclusion 
Arbitration remains an effective means of quick and inexpensive 
dispute resolution, but it cannot and should not be used to thwart a VCP 
from asserting claims. Italian Colors sent shockwaves through the 
consumer-advocate community.164 The American Association of Justice 
went so far as to write that “[t]he Supreme Court rule[d] that corporations 
can use the fine print of contracts to grant themselves a license to steal and 
159. See supra notes 62−64. 
160. Gilles, supra note 77, at 844.  
161. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 681 F.3d at 142. 
162. One possible suggestion for the specific claim limit here can be lifted from Thomas E. 
Carbonneau’s proposed amendment to the FAA. He suggested “[c]ases involving the enforcement of 
fundamental statutory rights” be deemed nonarbitrable, including “those arising from antitrust 
statutes, the securities legislation, RICO, labor statutes, and other regulatory legislative frameworks 
deemed essential by Congress.” Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitration and the U.S. Supreme Court: A 
Plea for Statutory Reform, 5 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 231, 273 (1990). 
 163. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 681 F.3d at 142. If the courts are capable of determining 
class action status under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and engaging in other types of initial 
analysis, a cost-based analysis should provide the type of hurdle expected by detractors. Specific claims 
under which the inquiry should be made can be fleshed out by the courts in due time. 
 164. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Justices Support Corporate Arbitration, N.Y. Times, June 20, 
2013, at B3; Paul Bland, Worst Supreme Court Arbitration Decision Ever, Pub. Justice (June 20, 2013), 
http://publicjustice.net/blog/worst-supreme-court-arbitration-decision-ever. 
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violate the law.”165 Following Concepcion, some of the most well-known 
companies in the world such as Microsoft,166 Instagram,167and others168 
inserted arbitration clauses with CAAWs in their standard agreements. 
After Italian Colors, there may be little preventing any corporation from 
including a CAAW in contracts with consumers. 
Congress passed the FAA with the intention that arbitration would 
help facilitate claim adjudication. Now, with the proliferation of CAAWs 
and repeated Supreme Court approval, DCPs can draft contracts that 
prevent claims from ever seeing the light of day. Federal legislation would 
override the detrimental impact of Concepcion and Italian Colors and 
bring stability back to the arbitration system. Long gone are the days when 
contracts of adhesion were considered by the courts to be unconscionable 
and unenforceable, but by passing appropriate legislation, Congress can 
signal that the little guy will be at least given the opportunity to have his or 
her grievances heard. 
 165. Press Release, Am. Assoc. for Justice, AAJ Statement on SCOTUS Decision in American 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant (June 20, 2013), available at http://www.justice.org/cps/rde/ 
justice/hs.xsl/21293.htm. 
 166. Meg Marco, Microsoft Updates Service Agreement to Make It Easier to Read the New 
Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clause, Consumerist (Aug. 31, 2012), http://consumerist.com/ 
2012/08/31/microsoft-updates-service-agreement-to-make-it-easier-to-read-the-new-mandatory-
binding-arbitration-clause. 
 167. Jacob Gersham, Have a Beef with Instagram? Civil Suit May Be Off Limits, Wall St. J.L. 
Blog (Jan. 2, 2013, 5:06 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/01/02/have-a-beef-with-instagram-a-civil-
suit-might-be-off-limits/?cb=logged0.35796129144728184. 
 168. Forced Arbitration Rogues Gallery, Pub. Citizen, http://www.citizen.org/forced-arbitration-
rogues-gallery (last visited June 1, 2014). 
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